

The University of Arizona Undergraduate Historical Review

Volume 1, Summer 2009

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Phi Alpha Theta

Produced by the Zeta Omega Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta

About the *University of Arizona Undergraduate Historical Review*

The *University of Arizona Undergraduate Historical Review* is the brainchild of a cadre of enterprising history undergrads at the University of Arizona Tucson. It was first conceived in the fall of 2008 by members of the Zeta Omega chapter of Phi Alpha Theta Historical honorary society. Our inaugural issue was published in the June of 2009.

A Letter from the Editorial Board:

Greetings to all history students and enthusiasts:

In our inaugural issue of the *University of Arizona Undergraduate Historical Review*, we have striven to showcase the ample talents of the historians we have on campus. Our papers encompass a wide variety of subjects, and a diversity of authors and thinkers.

It is our intention at this publication, to allow undergraduate students of significant and promising ability in both historical analysis and writing the opportunity to display their work and expose their ideas to the academic community including their classmates, professors, advisors and friends.

Furthermore, our editorial board is dedicated to promoting the valuable skills of editing, proof-reading, managing and publishing in what we hope will become a biennial tradition here at the University of Arizona. Editorial board membership is open to history and non-history majors who are members in good standing of the Zeta Omega Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta or the Undergraduate History Club and we encourage all members to consider joining us in helping to put together future volumes of the publication.

We also encourage all undergraduates, graduate students, or enthusiasts to submit high-quality original papers, essays and book reviews for upcoming and future issues of the *University of Arizona Undergraduate Historical Review*. The deadline for submissions to be included in our winter issue will be November 5, 2009.

We would like to thank everyone interested in participating in the publication of this journal and hope that it will continue to grow and ferment historical intellectualism among University of Arizona undergraduates.

Sincerely,

Austin Smith and Sean P. Harvey
Managing Editors

Contributors:

“George B. McClellan: Political Forces and Generalship” by Tyler Green

I am a Senior at the University of Arizona double-majoring in History and Environmental Science with a minor in Latin American Studies. Although I wrote this paper specifically for a "Civil War and Reconstruction" during my sophomore year, nineteenth century America and the Civil War are my primary areas of historical interest. Currently (Summer of 2009), I am interning at Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park as a historical interpreter.

“A Split Decision: How Republican Division Ensured Democratic Victory” by Kirk McFarland

My name is Kirk McFarland and a "non-traditional" student at the U of A, having returned to college after working as a truck driver and raising a family for twenty years. I am a History major and Sociology minor and in my senior year. This paper was written for History 396, a capstone course. I am also an intern with the Arizona Historical Society, presently doing research on the Bisbee Deportation of 1917.

“A Kinder, Gentler Government” by Michael Baratta

Michael Baratta graduated from the University of Arizona in the spring of 2007. He enjoys European History and wrote the piece he contributed to this volume of the review for History 436, “Civil War and Reconstruction.”

“The Origins of the Great Schism” by Ben Korta

I am a senior in history, philosophy, and English. Next year, I will study abroad at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, where I will attend courses in philosophy and literature, and begin studying the German language. After a short break, I plan on going on to grad school in a comparative literature program. This paper was written as a final research project in a judaic studies course I took my sophomore year entitled "Islam, Israel and the West," which examined the history of Judaism and Islam in relation to the Christian West.

George B. McClellan: Political Forces and Generalship

As perhaps the most pivotal four years in the history of the United States, there has been a great deal of discourse, both professional and not, concerning every aspect of the Civil War, and a popular theme of these discussions are the particular merits of individual generals. Out of these debates, prominent figures have taken on almost legendary personas, some flattering and some not. For example, Robert E. Lee is associated with the daring and ingenuity he exhibited at Chancellorsville and Second Manassas, Ambrose Burnside with his disastrous attack at Fredericksburg, and William T. Sherman with his devastating march across Georgia. However, in the midst of this popular history much has been lost or deliberately forgotten. As the second and fourth commander of the Army of the Potomac, General George B. McClellan has stirred up such a stampede of controversy as to have inspired Stephen W. Spears in his book entitled *Controversies and Commanders* to speak of “not one General McClellan but four General McClellans”.¹ Spears, of course, is not writing literally of four commanding generals or even four commanding styles but rather of the ways in which historians through the ages have depicted this divisive figure. To simply write another general work condoning or criticizing his generalship, especially in so brief a format, would be fruitless; however, there is still much to be written about George B. McClellan’s brief and intermittent tenure at the head of the Army of the Potomac from July of 1861 to November of the following year. Despite the flurry of professional opinions circulating on this topic, popular understanding is very limited and, for the most part, indicts McClellan as extremely timid, overcautious, and even cowardly. That his relative failures as a general are based solely in these faults is rarely questioned. Yet this understanding is overly simplistic

and derives, at least in part, from a lack of knowledge concerning the turbulent social and political climate in which McClellan was forced to operate. Returning to the facts and ignoring the mythology surrounding General George B. McClellan and the Civil War as a whole, it is clear that political pressures dramatically and negatively influenced McClellan's generalship of all Northern Armies and especially of the Army of the Potomac.

From his initial appointment in July of 1861 to his final dismissal in September of 1862, the general-in-question was harassed by increasingly incessant and fervent calls for military action on the part of politicians and the public. This paper will focus exclusively on the segment of time where McClellan was most subjected to this politically fostered impatience, and that is the interval beginning with his promotion to general-in-chief and leading up to the abortive and uncompleted Peninsula Campaign in May, June, and July of 1862. Writing in 1885 and defending his early command in late summer and early August of 1861, McClellan is quick to recall "that impatient and unceasing clamor" calling for an offensive that would bring about a quick ending of the war. Though appearing understanding that such pressure is "inevitable amongst a people unaccustomed to war", he also acknowledges that it "finally forced [his hand]" in the execution of what he, as well as most other contemporaries and historians, have recognized as his primary duties after receiving command. Chief among these duties were the twin "herculean tasks" of reorganizing the "demoralized and undisciplined" Army of the Potomac fresh from defeat at First Manassas and providing for the defenses of Washington.²

Despite widespread calls for McClellan's military attentions to be spent elsewhere, at least one other man of a non-civilian vocation deemed this preparation time as valuable to the cause of the North. Speaking of the former task, Philippe, Comte de Paris and aide-de-camp

to General McClellan, lauds McClellan for “[resisting] the impatient solicitations of both the people and the government...in order to give his weapon every perfection”. The aforementioned weapon is none other than the Army of the Potomac, and “[knowing] that an army tied up about a place is virtually paralyzed”, as Philippe asserts he does, McClellan patiently completes his second duty, the fortification of the Capital.³ Taking command after Irwin McDowell’s premature but politically motivated thrust at Richmond failed at First Manassas, McClellan, who had “inherited in August a situation similar to the one that faced McDowell in May”, could have only been all too anxious to avoid a repeat disaster.⁴ Though the impatient populace and politicians did not understand the prerequisite nature of these essential operations to an offensive in the East, men of a military mind found them to be quite necessary. Because Lincoln assured McClellan that he “could have his own way in the matter” during his early months of command, another potential debacle was averted and McClellan was able to prepare the eastern theater for a prolonged conflict, yet, in the interim, public and political outcry for battle magnified.⁵

As the fall of 1861 turned to winter and the New Year crept steadily nearer, “the pressure on Lincoln from Congress and from the public for an offensive was tremendous”, but still “the Army of the Potomac [lay] idle in its camps”.⁶ McClellan’s position at the head of the Army of the Potomac exacerbated the problem. Perhaps due to the great distance separating it from the political capital in Washington and the major press forums in the major cities on the Eastern Seaboard, “inactivity in the West was easily overlooked”. Conversely, at the center of both generators of public and political discourse, McClellan was subject to the harshest “political demands for action” that were all too often “based upon unrealistic expectations”.⁷

No longer able to ignore the rising tide of criticism leveled at both him and his chief general, Lincoln issues Executive War Order No. 1 on January 27, 1862 which called for “a general movement of the Land and Naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces” on the 22nd of February 1862.⁸ The direct citation of the Army of the Potomac as one of the armies ordered into action was unnecessary. The intent of the edict was clear; it was meant “to stir McClellan to some kind of action”. However, for many legitimate reasons, the order failed to achieve its desired effect. To begin with, the order was so absurd and devoid of military foresight that it “brought much ridicule on Lincoln then and later”. Giving McClellan barely a month to conceive of and arrange for massive operations on multiple fronts, the decree also blatantly ignored all possibility of new strategic deployments on the part of the Confederacy and also the weather conditions during the predetermined period of advance.⁹ In addition to general concerns about the legitimacy of these orders, McClellan had very concrete grounds to stay put for the duration of the winter.

If McClellan’s reasons for delaying his offensive were solid, the ground over which his forces would be forced to march if the Presidents order was obeyed would not be. Of this winter, a soldier in the Army of the Potomac wrote in his diary that “you can not imagine what mud is until you have lived in Va.” while others proclaimed bitterly that “it [had] not been pleasant more than half a dozen days since the first of Jan.”.¹⁰ According to Philippe, the aid-de-camp of McClellan, poor weather conditions made active campaigning difficult as it would have been “impracticable to provision an advancing army” due to “the impassable condition of the roads”.¹¹ The larger lack of campaigning that took place between the months of December and March throughout the entirety of the Civil War also casts doubt on the practicability of winter warfare. During that same winter, Sherman and Grant had cut off

their campaign in the West after the abortive assault on Chickasaw Bluff at the end of December, and even “Fighting” Joe Hooker waited until May of 1863 to begin his campaigning with the Army of the Potomac.¹² Ambrose Burnside’s spectacularly unsuccessful “mud march” that occurred shortly after the Battle of Fredericksburg is also called to mind.

Even if McClellan was inclined to make a risky advance and “expose raw troops to the rigors of a winter campaign”, the Army of the Potomac was still not fully prepared for action.¹³ Anxious calls for action by non-military men during the aforementioned winter take appear almost ludicrously foolish when, according to Thomas J. Rowland, many soldiers “had not received their issues of overcoats” and others “were forced to drill and parade with only their drawers”¹⁴ Furthermore, the Army also lacked the weapons with which to confront the enemy in the inevitable battle that an offensive would invite. According to McClellan’s article in *Century Illustrated Magazine* in 1885, the “armament of the infantry was not satisfactorily completed until the winter, and a large part of the field batteries were not ready for service until the spring of 1862”.¹⁵ In this case, it does not take a militarily trained mind to comprehend that the pitting of a half-naked and scarcely armed Army of the Potomac against the entrenched and ever-dangerous Army of Northern Virginia would clearly represent a losing endeavor. Contemporaries and historians alike underestimated the enormity of the organizational and provisional task that faced McClellan, so colossally difficult in fact that the counterpoising yet significantly smaller Confederate army was never properly supplied, and therefore the majority of the time he spent in attending to these matters was seen as an unnecessary procrastination.

In addition to the logistical inadvisability of such a movement, Philippe also recognizes a key political inexpediency of any attack during the winter of 1861-62. With relations between the United States and Great Britain on tenterhooks because of the forcible removal of several Confederate Diplomats from the British ship the *Trent* by Captain Charles Wilkes of the *U.S.S San Jacinto* on November 8, it would have been inadvisable for McClellan “to compromise the safety of his forces by any attempt at operations on the other side of the Potomac”. Admittedly, it is not the general-in-chief’s role to “implicate himself in questions of a purely political character”, but understanding the severe military ramifications of open war with Britain, prudence could have only cautioned McClellan to wait until the political crises had passed.¹⁶ Intimately familiar with all of these conditions, McClellan persuades Lincoln to “[dispense] with [General War Order No. 1] by not requiring its execution”.¹⁷ However, at this time, Lincoln is considerably less convinced of the necessity of delay, and public and political pressure exhibited on him by the Radical wing of his own party only grows more strident and insistent.

Failure on the part of politicians, including those of the War Department and the Commander-in-Chief, and the public to see this necessary period of preparation as such eroded trust of McClellan’s generalship. Although such trust naturally allows for military success – and, at this point, it is not amiss to note that governmental and private faith in Robert E. Lee allowed for many of his military victories, the Peninsula campaign on which McClellan embarked in the Spring of 1862 was one that would completely “depend for success upon the support and cooperation it got from several agencies of the government”. McClellan’s plan hinged on the cooperation of the Navy and War Departments for the neutralization of the Confederate ironclad, the *Merrimac*, and the “destruction of the enemy

batteries on the York [River]”. Mutual confidence and goodwill was required for such intricate collaboration between the government and the army, and “if ever a general lacked [these things], [McClellan] did”. Moreover, because Lincoln was not entirely convinced of the General’s strategy, he placed several stipulations on its execution, yet, once the plan was in motion, it certainly would have engendered more success if he “had given the General a free hand in working out the details”.¹⁸ In this manner, the widespread lack of understanding the judiciousness of McClellan’s utilization of the autumn, winter, and spring of 1861-62 adversely affected the offensive that took place the following summer. While it is unproductive, although it has been repeatedly done, to pin McClellan’s apparent failure on the Peninsula exclusively on the political impatience for action of the day, it is equally fruitless to maintain that it didn’t make things more difficult for him.

An entirely different way in which politics spread its influence over the generalship of McClellan originated in the differing war aims between the extremely powerful Radical Republican contingent of Congress and Democrats. Radical Republicans, asserts T. Harry Williams in a journal article entitled “The Committee on the Conduct of War: An Experiment in Civilian Control”, saw “the outbreak of war a golden opportunity to destroy the institution [of slavery]”. However, many of “the important commands, the major and brigadier generalships,” were given to anti-abolitionist Democrats, and prominent among these men was George B. McClellan.¹⁹ Willing to partake of “any method that [promised] success” in achieving their political goals, the Committee on the Conduct of War was officially created to “inquire into the conduct of the present war” in December of 1861.²⁰ In reality, the committee was intended as a weapon with which to impose the faction’s political aims on the President and upon the military. Any military leader that strayed from a strictly abolitionist

viewpoint became a target, and it did not take long for McClellan to fall under the reproachful eye of this committee. Although General Charles Stone became, in the words of George Meade, the first “victim of political malice” when he was relieved of duty and arrested for the military debacle at Ball’s Bluff in October of 1861, McClellan “accurately perceived that he, rather than Stone, was the Committee’s actual target”.^{21,22}

In addition to the not inconsequential psychological effect of being slated for removal might have on an individual – and many historians have wondered about the so-called “persecution complex” McClellan displayed whilst in action on the Peninsula, it also produced more concrete consequences for the general-in question.²³ Benjamin Wade, the chairman of the Committee, declared that this political body “only state[s] what in [its] opinion tends to impeach them...and then leave it to better judges to decide”.²⁴ In the former statement, “them” were the leaders the Committee sought to destroy while the “better judge” was often Lincoln, the commander-in-chief, with whom ultimately rested all military authority. With McClellan, the material presented to President Lincoln by members of the committee and Edwin Stanton, the Secretary of War, framed McClellan as “‘traitorous’ for ‘leaving Washington uncovered and open to attack’” when he moved the Army of the Potomac to begin fighting.²⁵ Although the President continued to halfheartedly sustain his General throughout the summer, when McClellan was finally relieved of command in November of 1862, Lincoln privately admits “to fear[ing]” that McClellan “was playing false” and that the general “did not want to hurt the enemy”.²⁶ From all historical evidence, such accusations are false. Certainly not the sole basis for his dismissal, these unsubstantiated allegations of disloyalty factored in his expulsion from his position at the head of the Army

of the Potomac, and that this occurrence represents a concrete intrusion on the part of Republican politics on the generalship of George McClellan.

Concisely stated, in the words of William P. Fessenden, Congress during the time of the Civil War was “not under the command of the military of this country” but rather “[the military is] under ours as a Congress”.²⁷ Constituting the primary political body of the United States, the Congress wielded extensive control of the military proceedings of the Union, and McClellan and his Army of the Potomac exemplified political domination in this arena. Unfortunately for McClellan, political influence over his command proved to be detrimental in two principal ways. Primarily, political and social impatience for action eroded trust in McClellan’s generalship during necessary preparation of the Army of the Potomac for campaigning. Secondly but of no less significance, the political implement of the Radical Republican faction of Congress, the Committee on the Conduct of War, was one of the catalysts that brought about his eventual dismissal from command. When discussing figures such as George B. McClellan whose persona have taken on legendary proportions, it is often assumed, especially within the treacherous realm of popular history, that these personal strengths and faults are the sole determinants of the relative accomplishments and failures. However, it is essential to remember that such people did not exist in a vacuum and that there are always other factors at work on any given individual or circumstance. The damaging effect of the political conditions at the time of the Civil War on the leadership of General McClellan is certainly proof of that.

Notes:

1. Stephen W. Spears, *Controversies and Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 13.
2. George B. McClellan, "The Peninsular Campaign: May and June 1862," *Century Illustrated Magazine*, May 1885, 136, <http://serials.abc-clio.com>.
3. Philippe, "McClellan Organizing the Grand Army," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 2, ed. Robert Underwood Johnson (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., 1959), 113.
4. Thomas J. Rowland, *George B. McClellan and Civil War History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman* (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1998), 144.
5. *Ibid.*, 144.
6. T. Harry Williams, *Lincoln and his Generals* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 62.
7. Rowland, *George B. McClellan and Civil War History*, 149.
8. President's General War Order No. 1, January 27, 1862, in *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 113.
9. Williams, *Lincoln and his Generals*, 62.
10. Jeffry D. Wert, *Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 53.
11. Philippe, "McClellan Organizing the Grand Army", 120.
12. Rowland, *George B. McClellan and Civil War History*, 146.
13. Philippe, "McClellan Organizing the Grand Army", 120.
14. Rowland, *George B. McClellan and Civil War History*, 146.
15. McClellan, "The Peninsular Campaign", 137.
16. Philippe, "McClellan Organizing the Grand Army", 118.
17. Williams, *Lincoln and his Generals*, 65.
18. *Ibid.*, 73-74.
19. T. Harry Williams, "The Committee on the Conduct of War: An Experiment in Civilian Control," *The Journal of the American Military Institute* 3, no. 3 (1939): 138-140, <http://www.jstor.org>.
20. *Ibid.*, 141.
21. Wert, *Sword of Lincoln*, 59.
22. Rowland, *George B. McClellan and Civil War History*, 142.
23. Sears, *Controversies and Commanders*, 12.
24. Williams, "The Committee on the Conduct of War", 151.
25. McClellan, "The Peninsular Campaign", 140.
26. Wert, *Sword of Lincoln*, 179.
27. Williams, "The Committee on the Conduct of War", 141.

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<http://www.jstor.org>.

A Kinder, Gentler Government?

The Civil War was a unique event in United States history, the war being one of insurrection and fought on the very footstep of, if not at times within, the territory of the Union. Many a scholar has argued that the measures taken by the federal government to meet such a contingency as this constituted a major breach of American civil liberties. In actuality, the extent to which the government interfered with and cracked down on dissent and suspect expressions of disloyalty and treason – verbal or more substantial in nature – was restrained and limited throughout the duration of the war. The extent of government action during the war can be gauged in terms of three measures commonly taken by a country at war or ruled by a despotic form of government, the three being 1) the arbitrary arrest of persons suspected of disloyalty, 2) efforts taken in regards to those charged with treason, and 3) the censoring or suppression of the press. The paper will proceed to tackle each of the above points in the order already presented.

The event most often used by scholars in their efforts to highlight civil rights abuses on the part of the government during the Civil War is that of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* and the subsequent arrests of thousands. That such action was taken is an undeniable fact; the extent to which suspension of the privilege of the writ was extended and exercised, as well as how these factors affected the liberties of the people of the wartime North is a subject open for debate. The main contention here is that Lincoln's method in regards to suspension of the privilege of the writ was one of gradual suspension, it first having been extended over one area of the country, then to another, and so on until the administration finally felt it necessary to extend a general suspension of the privilege of the writ over the whole of the country; these half-measures stemmed not only from uncertainty

on Lincoln's part as to the legality of his actions (or perhaps uncertainty as to how to word his defenses of the legality of his actions) but also a reluctance to do soⁱ.

The very first order providing for suspension of the privilege of the writ was limited to a matter of military expediency. With rebel forces encamped not very far from the capital and with anti-Union sentiment in Maryland – the only corridor through which troops were able to move into and garrison the capital – running high, it was imperative to ensure that lines of communication between Washington and friendly Pennsylvania be maintained. Following altercations between citizens in Baltimore and soldiers passing through the city incidental to their journey to the capitalⁱⁱ, as well as fears that important Maryland bridges might be rendered useless, Lincoln acted and issued a suspension of the privilege of the writ to apply “at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington”ⁱⁱⁱ. Orders of suspension with similarly limited scope were issued soon thereafter, one for Florida^{iv} (the only instance of this happening in a Confederate state^v) and another in the case of a single individual.

Throughout the remainder of the first year of the war, not only did such proclamations remain limited in scope (with only one more being issued during the time in question) but the number of arrests remained small. Secretary of State Seward and the State Department over which he presided were in charge of overseeing arrests of US citizens (a duty discharged by the department until February 1862); a small number of persons, numbering a mere 864 persons, were arrested during this period^{vi}, and in light of the secretary's “reputation for ruthless suppression of civil liberties during the Civil War”^{vii}, the fact that he oversaw the arrest of such a small number (the total number exceeding 10,000 for the whole duration of

the war) of persons is an indication of the restraint (whether due to inability or indisposition) under which he operated in efforts to crush dissent.

Furthermore, on February 14, 1863, Lincoln in an executive order concerning political prisoners ordered “all political prisoners or state prisoners now held in military custody be released on their subscribing to a parole engaging them to render no aid or comfort to the enemies in hostility to the United States”^{viii}. The order further stipulated that all such released persons would be granted a pardon for any treasonous or disloyal actions on their part that had landed them in prison in the first place. This trend towards leniency on the part of the government in regard to these arrests of citizens by no means ended here; note should be taken of two individuals – one of whom was almost certainly a spy^{ix}, the other having given secret military information to rebel forces^x – both of whom were released following a simple taking of the oath of allegiance! Such actions almost seem to be ones of gross negligence of the government’s responsibility to protect the integrity of Union war efforts rather than blatant and high-handed attempts at cracking down on disloyal behavior bordering on treasonous.

Examples of similar incidents abound; in one such case a military commission even handed down a ruling in opposition to its own interests. Originally charged to investigate the cases of some blockade-runners then languishing in fortress prisons, the commission not only recommended the release of the prisoners but also ruled that it and similarly constituted military courts had no authority to try civilians for *any* offense^{xi}! Such commissions had been given the very authority this particular tribunal now denied itself in accordance with a presidential decree; this incident only serves to demonstrate yet again the confusion and

common tendency “to go easy” on the supposed “bad-guys” within the government and government organizations like the armed forces.

A final point that need mentioning concerns the Habeas Corpus Act finally passed by Congress in 1863. Although the Act implicitly condones the actions taken by the president to suspend the privilege of the writ (Congress later indemnifies the president’s actions explicitly in a separate act) and gives him the authority to continue to do so, the Act also places a block upon the extent to which the suspension and the arbitrary arrests made possible by it can be carried out. Sections 2 & 3 of the Act stipulate that if any Grand Jury ends its session without returning an indictment or presentment on a person being held, a judge can order the release of said person as well as charge any military officers failing to comply with a misdemeanor punishable by a fine and jail term^{xii}. In such an action, the government once again demonstrates a softer position in regards to those most likely held in confinement on suspicion of disloyalty or treason.

The story of treason during the Civil War begins on somewhat of a strange note. In accordance with its constitutional prerogatives, Congress set forth the penalty for treason in the Treason Statute of the Crimes Act of 1790^{xiii}, the aforementioned penalty being in all cases death. Once the war of rebellion began and thousands of “traitors” began to stream into POW camps, Congress was forced to modify the definition of and punishment for treason, the strange irony being the weakening of treason laws during a period of time in which the crime was so rife. The manner in which the government was to deal with treason and disloyalty throughout the duration of the Civil War would be guided by the Conspiracies Act of 1861 and the Treason Act of 1862. Most significantly, the Treason Act set new penalties for treason to that of a fine and prison term^{xiv} which quite intentionally had the

effect of mitigating the harsh death penalty set decades earlier and allowing for more flexibility in the actions the government could take in response to this crime.

If one of the first cases of treason is to act as a precedent for cases that follow, the case of Thorndyke Brooks, inhabitant of Williamson County in Illinois, would indicate a moving in the direction of less rigorous, perhaps even lax, enforcement of treason laws. After raising a company of volunteers in Williamson County, Brooks marched at their head into Kentucky where his small force merged with a Confederate army assembling there. Such treasonous credentials as he had already established were further strengthened by his fighting with distinction in the Confederate army against his former countrymen, rising to a commissioned officer's rank before the end of the war. Soon after his leaving for Kentucky, an indictment for treason was issued against Brooks *in absentia* by the US Circuit Court with jurisdiction over that part of the country; incidentally, his indictment would be the first and last issued for treason by that court for the duration of the war. Furthermore, Brooks' case was never brought to trial, continuing term after term until finally being "stricken from the docket in 1864"^{xv}. If a proven rebel and traitor was able to escape prosecution and punishment during a time when the very existence of the country was threatened, how did this bode for the treasonous and disloyal persons supposed to be lurking amongst the people of the Union? In other words, what would be the extent of the government's response to supposed threats from within?

Another interesting treason case concerns two US senators. In the case of one, Jesse D. Bright of Indiana, the senator was expelled from the Senate in response to a note he had sent Jefferson Davis recommending the Confederate president take advantage of the services of a certain Texas weapons dealer^{xvi} (the note having been sent months after hostilities had

already commenced, no less!). While action was swift and harsh in this instance, the opposite held true for the other senator. While Bright has merely sent a note, Benjamin Stark of Oregon was well known to have “gone on record against the war and in favor of Southern independence” and according to affidavits from eyewitnesses he drank a toast to the Confederate victory at First Bull Run as well as stated he would sell his property and go fight for the South if war broke out^{xvii}. If Bright’s note was proof of his disloyalty and grounds for his expulsion, Stark’s declared intentions and sympathies should have provided more than sufficient grounds for his expulsion. The debate over expulsion, however, dragged on for over five months and in the end the members of the legislative branch of the government decided on a restrained reaction to Stark’s supposed disloyalty (despite the fact that a committee appointed to investigate Stark ruled he was in fact disloyal) and a final vote to expel him failed^{xviii}.

The central government’s actions in regards to the press constitute another gauge of the government’s mild response to instances of dissent and expressions of disloyalty. Throughout the duration of the war, anti-government newspapers were unrelenting in their scathing denunciations and yet the central government’s actions were noteworthy in their mildness, in some respected even more so when compared to the relative freedom of the press we enjoy today. The majority of actions taken against newspapers and editors were taken on the initiative of overzealous army officers, soldiers, mobs of angry locals, and local/state officials, few of whom, if any acted with the blessing of the Lincoln administration. A case in point would be the destruction of the printing office of the local Portsmouth, New Hampshire newspaper *States and Union*. Not only is the place far from any area under rebellion but the timing, April 10, 1865, is the day after Lee’s surrender to

Grant and seems odd considering that the war is more or less concluded. Yet a mob feels sufficiently enraged by the supposed pro-Southern sympathies of the editor of the paper to take matters into their own hands and wreck every piece of equipment in the office^{xix}.

Although the newspaper described in the above incident may very well have been the innocent victim of mob violence, other newspapers cannot be seen in as innocent a light. When General Ambrose Burnside, fresh from his humiliation at Fredericksburg, was appointed the commander of the Department of the Ohio, he soon demonstrated an out-of-touch zeal for squashing dissent in his General Orders No. 38 issued on April 13, 1863. This general order declared that convicted spies and traitors would be executed as well as stating that those “declaring sympathies for the enemy” would be arrested and tried^{xx}; thus, in one fell swoop General Burnside not only defined treason (a few days later declaring to a crowd he had the authority to do so) but also set himself up for an incident with the press. Not even two months had passed before Burnside ordered the suppression of the *Chicago Times*, a paper noted for its advocacy of peace and a supporter of the Ohio’s most prominent Copperhead, Vallandigham^{xxi}, as well as a publication declared a public nuisance by such Republican stalwarts as Governor Morton of Indiana and Governor Yates of Illinois. Carried out on June 3, the suppression order was promptly revoked by Lincoln the very next day, an action the *Chicago Tribune* lamented as being a “triumph of treason”^{xxii}. Despite what at least one Cabinet member felt were efforts by the *Times* to “give, so far as they [Vallandigham and the *Times*] dare, aid and comfort [to the Rebels]”^{xxiii}, Lincoln did not use the vast power of the government to suppress this shrill dissenting voice.

Even so, Lincoln himself was only ever directly responsible for one order suppressing two newspapers, this being the only recorded instance of him doing so through the duration

of his presidency^{xxiv}. The two papers in question, the *New York World* and the *New York Journal of Commerce*, sent shockwaves through the nation when on the morning of May 18, 1864 they printed a proclamation attributed to the White House in which Lincoln calls for a day of fasting and prayer in addition to a call for the drafting of 400,000 men. Coming as the story did on the heels of Grant's second bloody battle of the Virginia Campaign at Spotsylvania, the story was an instant sensation. The White House soon learned of the existence of the sensational story as generals and state officials telegraphed Washington for a confirmation or denial of the report. Given the vehemently anti-government reputation of the two papers (the *Journal* "for years [having been] a propagandist for slavery and defender of Southern rights" as well as having been "barred from the mails" for its disloyal bent^{xxv}), Lincoln heeded the calls of several Cabinet members to take stern action and issued an order effecting the total suppression of the offending newspapers, seizing the printing offices and arresting the newspapers' editors. Even at this point the suppression of the two papers, although officially done at the hand of the president, was a lukewarm action at best. For instance, at the aforementioned meeting of Cabinet members Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles in his diary contends that Lincoln acquiesced to the act more to please Seward – one of the most vocal in calling for stern action – than for any other reason^{xxvi}. Not long after that, Lincoln revoked the part of the order providing for the arrest of the editors, although the printing offices remained in the Army's hands for three days; here again one should take note of Lincoln's attitude, indications being that Lincoln's intentions were not vindictive in nature^{xxvii}. As it stands, the whole incident was found to have been instigated by two editors of another paper, they having agreed to create a forged presidential proclamation, send it to

the press, and cash in when gold prices would undoubtedly go up in response to the sensational news^{xxviii}!

The above incident needs to be examined in light of the reputation and general tenor of the suppressed papers. The *Journal*'s shortcomings have been touched on; one newspaper described the *New York World* as “the most false and scurrilous of all the assailants of the President and of the Republican party during the past year or two”^{xxix}. While newspapers such as these lambasted Lincoln and his administration, couching such criticism in terms that many around the country considered disloyal and as attempts to incite open resistance to the government, he himself never lifted a finger against them except in the one instance; he only did so in the face of what appeared to be a willful and intentional attempt to cause turmoil, and even then he took action only with the greatest reluctance.

Finally, one more thing stands out greatly in regards to the contention that the press exercised a great deal of freedom during the Civil War: the press regularly published “plans of campaign, movement of troops, the location and strength of military units”^{xxx}, etc. throughout the duration of the war and were never widely suppressed for doing so. Even the revelation about Lee’s order of battle that fell into McClellan’s hands just prior to the bloodbath at Antietam could be found in the newspapers’ regular printing of highlights of sessions of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War^{xxxi}!

As the greatest trial the young nation had faced up to that time drew to a close, many of the fears associated with the enlarged powers and role of the federal government, in time, were found to be baseless. Elections at all levels of government continued – although occasionally disrupted by an overzealous soldier or crowd – throughout the duration of the war; if, as some scholars maintain, the presidential election of 1864 was a referendum on

President Lincoln and his handling of the war, then his sweeping victory in November would seem to be anything but an indication of widespread dissatisfaction with the government's actions by a majority of the Union population. Perhaps the greatest indication of the government's restrained policy towards treason was the series of generous amnesties issued after the war. Although Congress spoke tough, issuing legislation punishing treason and disloyalty with imprisonment and fines and for a time with political disabilities, Congress itself – with the exception of a few die-hard Congressmen – in the end pardoned almost all those involved in the rebellion^{xxxii}

- ¹ Neely, Mark E. *The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 12-13.
- ¹ *Ibid*, 4.
- ¹ United States War Department. *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), ser. II, vol. 2: 19.
- ¹ *Ibid*, 19.
- ¹ Neely, *The Fate of Liberty*, 9-10.
- ¹ *Ibid*, 23.
- ¹ *Ibid*, 18.
- ¹ *Official Records*, ser. II, vol. 2: 223.
- ¹ *Ibid*, 306.
- ¹ *Ibid*, 310.
- ¹ Neely, *The Fate of Liberty*, 143-44; *Official Records*, ser. II, vol. 7, 194-95.
- ¹ "The Habeas Corpus Act." *Chicago Tribune*, March 5, 1863, pg. 1. <http://proquest.umi.com/>
- ¹ Randall, James G. *Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951), 75, 79; Weyl, Nathaniel. *Treason: The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal in American History* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950), 267.
- ¹ Randall, *Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln*, 80.
- ¹ Blake, Kellee Green. "Aiding and Abetting..." *Illinois Historical Journal* 87 (1994), 97.
- ¹ Cooney, Charles F. "Treason or Tyranny?..." *Civil War Times Illustrated* 18 (1979), 30-31.
- ¹ Shearer, D. H. "A Traitor in the Senate." *Civil War Times Illustrated* 34 (1995), 55.
- ¹ *Ibid*, 57.
- ¹ Harper, Robert S. *Lincoln and the Press* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951), 193-94.
- ¹ *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. 23, pt. 2: 237.
- ¹ Harper, *Lincoln and the Press*, 258.
- ¹ "The Revocation." *Chicago Tribune*, June 5, 1863, pg. 1. <http://proquest.umi.com/>.
- ¹ Beale, Howard K, ed. *Diary of Gideon Welles* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1960), 1:322.
- ¹ Harper, *Lincoln and the Press*, 289.
- ¹ *Ibid*, 293.
- ¹ Beale, *Diary of Gideon Welles*, 2:37-38.
- ¹ Harper, *Lincoln and the Press*, 297.
- ¹ *Ibid*, 296.
- ¹ *Ibid*, 290.
- ¹ Randall, *Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln*, 485.
- ¹ "The Conduct of the War" *New York Times*, May 3, 1863, pg. 2. <http://proquest.umi.com/>; *S. Rep. Com. No. 108*, 37th Congress, 3rd Session (1863). LexisNexis Congressional Universe. <http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/>.
- ¹ "Speaker James G. Blaine..." Perman, Michael. *Major Problems in the Civil War and Reconstruction*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 406.

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A Split Decision: How Republican Division Ensured Democratic Victory

On a cold autumn evening, October 14th, 1912, presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt left the Gilpatrick Hotel in Milwaukee, walked to the car that awaited him, and waved to a group of enthusiastic onlookers. The two term president was on his way to a nearby auditorium to give a speech that he hoped would assist in the appropriation of another term. As he stepped into the open automobile a lone figure emerged from the night, shot Roosevelt in the chest and shouted “No third term!”¹ The would be assassin believed the spirit of William McKinley had come to him in a dream and, referring to the Rough Rider, had proclaimed “this is my murderer; avenge my death.”² The crowd called for a lynching, but Roosevelt subdued the shouts, actually taking pity on the mad man. With a bullet in his chest the Progressive Party candidate ignored the wishes of his advisers and continued on to the auditorium to deliver his address. As he stood at the podium the colonel pulled a manuscript from his coat pocket and saw that the bullet had passed through it, along with his metal eyeglass holder. He then raised the manuscript above his head and proclaimed “It takes more than that to kill a Bull Moose!”³ The audience responded with wild appreciation.

The presidential election of 1912 has been called one of the most unique campaigns in American history, both in its extraordinary players and the circumstances surrounding it. The election included a former president, an incumbent president, a future president, and a felon. The former president and candidate for the newly organized Progressive Party, Theodore Roosevelt,

¹ Kelly, Frank, *The Fight for the White House*, 244-45.

² “Colonel Wounded in the Breast,” 1-2.

³ Kelly, 246.

had survived an assassination attempt. The incumbent, William Taft, learned in April of 1912 that the Titanic had sunk in the North Atlantic, taking with it one of his top advisors, Archie Butts. Then one week before the election his running mate James Sherman passed away, throwing his campaign into a tailspin. The future president, Woodrow Wilson, put a four inch gash in the top of his head while riding in an automobile just two days before the election. The felon, Socialist Party candidate Eugene Debs, who had been president of the American Railway Union, had spent time in jail after participating in the Pullman Strike of 1894.⁴

These four candidates shared one thing in common; they all claimed to be the qualified leader of the progressive movement. Everybody wanted social and economic reform. Big business had a firm grip on economic and political policy, despite the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, and the new president would be responsible for turning this trend around. The candidates all claimed to be progressive, but differed in their ideas on how to bring about this change. Indeed, the presidential election of 1912 came down to the decision on the part of the voters as to which form of progressivism would best suit the country. Another important factor, however, influenced the outcome of this election. The bond that at one time existed between William Taft and Theodore Roosevelt unraveled, and the Republican Party split in two. The election of 1912 had been determined when the “Bull Moose” stomped out of the Republican Convention, essentially handing the presidency to the Democratic nominee, Woodrow Wilson.

Economic issues dominated the 1912 election, but affected Americans both politically and socially. The question in the minds of most politicians centered on how to adjust to an ever growing corporate economy. Beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the United

⁴ Flehinger, Brett, *The 1912 Election and the Power of Progressivism*, 3-4.

States had experienced a shift from what historians call proprietary capitalism, a small scale, localized producer-orientated market that favored individual manufacturers and shopkeepers, to corporate capitalism, a large scale market based on massive, nationwide businesses, the modern corporation.⁵ This shift affected the American worker in many ways. Farmers had been held hostage to the fees charged by the railroad industry, which had a monopoly on the storage and transportation of goods. Although they produced more, their share of the nation's income had dropped. As one historian put it, "they were increasingly vulnerable to forces beyond their control."⁶ Industrial workers faced a different set of problems. Instead of being in control of their financial futures, more and more Americans went from employer to employee, their destiny now in the hands of the industrial complex. This was especially hard felt when the unemployment rate rose to twenty percent at the end of the nineteenth century. It resulted in a series of strikes, political protests, reform movements, and the birth of the Progressive Era.

Although cries for reform could be heard throughout the land, the year 1912 carried with it some extraordinary accomplishments and events. As suffragettes marched down Fifth Avenue in New York City, Model T's rolled off of Henry Ford's newly concocted assembly line and on to the streets. The mother of all ocean liners, the Titanic, ended its short lived career after finding an iceberg in the North Atlantic and sinking, becoming the permanent tomb for over a thousand passengers. With the possibility of prohibition lurking around the corner, those who enjoyed spirits could utilize the free booklet titled *Secrets and History of Making Liquors at Home*.

George M. Cohan, Broadway's darling, had scored yet another successful production with a play

⁵ Flehinger, 21-22.

⁶ Flehinger, 23.

called *Broadway Jones*, using his family as cast members.⁷ And the Socialist Party, with Eugene Debs as its candidate, received an unprecedented amount of popular votes in the presidential election.⁸

Best known as the leader of the Socialist Party from its beginnings in 1901 to his death in 1926,⁹ Eugene V. Debs certainly had his share of admirers as well as detractors. Pulitzer Prize recipient and social critic Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who thought highly of Debs, claimed that “the radical passions of the Jacksonians ... the Populists spoke through Debs – only now in the unaccustomed vocabulary of socialism“, and historian James Weinstein described him as “the champion of the oppressed.”¹⁰ The Socialist Party candidate’s opponents in the election did not think so kindly of him. Woodrow Wilson referred to Mr. Debs as a “traitor to his country” and Theodore Roosevelt, when commenting on the socialists, called them “mere inciters to murder and preachers of applied anarchy.”¹¹ Even though Roosevelt considered Debs an anarchist, their views on the emerging corporate economy had similarities. Both saw the growth of corporate power as an unstoppable force and a natural progression in American economics. The two politicians also agreed that the federal government should play a role in managing the trusts and monopolies that had become part of the system. Their solutions to the problem, however, differed greatly. Roosevelt believed that the integrity of these corporate giants lay in the hands of its leaders, and that the federal government should regulate the characters in charge. In contrast, Debs maintained that the industrial machine and the products it produced were greater than the

⁷ Kelly, 1-2

⁸ Morgan, Wayne H., “The Utopia of Eugene Debs,” 120.

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Corbin, David A., “Betrayal in the West Virginia Coal Mines,” 987.

¹¹ Radosh, Ronald, *Debs*, 132, 139.

individuals involved in its operation, and the rightful owner was the whole of society. The socialist leader asked “shall the trust be privately owned by a relatively few and operated for their fabulous enrichment, or shall it be owned by the people in their collective, organized, and enlightened capacity and operated for the benefit of all?”¹²

Eugene Debs’ career path did not come close to resembling that of his peers in the presidential campaign. He did not have the advantage of an Ivy League education, actually dropping out of school at the age of fourteen to take a job as a fireman on the railroad. Debs’ history of union activity began in 1875 when he joined the Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman, serving as its first secretary. This would be the beginning of more than thirty-five years of involvement in labor unions. As a leader of the American Railway Union the activist took part in the Pullman Strike of 1894, which grew out of a compensation dispute by the workers who constructed train cars by the Pullman Palace Car Company. Because the strike affected the movement of U.S. mail, then President Grover Cleveland called in the U.S. Army.¹³ Thirteen strikers lost their lives and federal authorities had Debs arrested for hindering the flow of mail. This event became a turning point his life. While serving his time, the union leader read *Capital* by Karl Marx and *Cooperative Commonwealth* by Gronlund, and he admitted that “it was here that socialism gradually laid hold of me.”¹⁴

The Socialist Party held its 1912 national convention on May 17th in Indianapolis, Indiana, and although not in attendance, Eugene V. Debs easily captured the presidential nomination; not a surprise since the labor union activist had won the nomination in 1904 and

¹² Flehinger, 54-55.

¹³ Tussey, Jean, ed. *Eugene V. Debs Speaks*, 40.

¹⁴ Tussey, 48.

1908. The Party platform called for the public ownership of all mines, quarries, oil wells, forests, water power, land, banking, grain elevators, stockyards, and warehouses. They advocated for women's suffrage, recall of public officials through special elections when necessary, minimum wage laws, unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, and the elimination of child labor.¹⁵ The radical agenda of the socialists appealed to a substantial number of Americans – they garnered 900,672 popular votes, equating to six percent¹⁶ – but certainly not enough to win the 1912 election. That distinction would belong to a gentleman who two years prior had been the President of Princeton University.

Thomas Woodrow Wilson seemed destined for politics. His father held prestigious positions within the Presbyterian Church and looked over young Thomas' education (he would later drop this name), corrected his writing, monitored his conversation, and introduced him to the writings of Tennyson and Dickens. After graduating from Princeton University in 1879, Wilson attended the University of Virginia Law School and in 1882 gained admittance to the bar. Disenchanted with law and its "scheming and haggling practice" he made his way to John Hopkins University for graduate training in law, government and jurisprudence. At this period in his life Wilson sought an outside role in politics through "literary and non-partisan agencies." For his doctoral dissertation he wrote *Congressional Government*, a highly regarded work that earned the student of politics "wide reputation as a scholar." In it Wilson discusses the three branches of government; the unchecked power of Congress, the president as an "impotent figurehead," and the Supreme Court as facilitating the actions of Congress. Although somewhat content to be an outside force in politics, the academic standout could not forget his "very real

¹⁵ Kelly, 126-127.

¹⁶ Robinson, Eugene, "Distribution of the Presidential Vote of 1912," 19.

regret that I have been shut out from my heart's *first* – primary – ambition and purpose... a *statesman's* career.”¹⁷

Following the success of *Congressional Government* with a series of books and academic articles on politics and history, Wilson taught as a professor at Princeton for a dozen years, and in 1902 began the position as the university's president. It was here the aspiring statesman honed his skills as a leader, and it was here Colonel George Brinton McClellan Harvey, an editor from *Harper's Weekly*, took a liking to the young politician. As early as 1906 Harvey had made it his “hobby” to put Woodrow Wilson in the White House. He saw Wilson as a safe and smart alternative to William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic Party nominee for president in 1896, 1900 and 1908. From 1909 to 1912 Harvey and his cohorts blazed a trail for Wilson, proposing in the May 15, 1909 issue of *Harper's Weekly*, “Looking Ahead: We now expect to see Woodrow Wilson elected governor of the State of New Jersey in 1910 and nominated for President in 1912....”¹⁸

Colonel Harvey's declaration would come true. Wilson won the governorship in New Jersey, easily defeating his Republican opponent. Soon afterward the road to Washington began.

On June 25, 1912, at the same time that the Democratic Party convention had begun, the Chicago Daily Tribune ran an editorial cartoon titled “The Time, the Place, and the Girl” which showed a female labeled “Opportunity” knocking on the Democrats door. She held a wreath with the words “Victory for Some Real Progressive” written across it. The people inside the Democratic household, squabbling with each other, did not notice Opportunity knocking, and she

¹⁷ Broderick, Francis L., *Progressivism at Risk*, 60.

¹⁸ Broderick, 61-63.

threatens to go next door to the house of the Progressives.¹⁹ The cartoon implied that due to the Republican split the White House belonged to the Democratic nominee, as long as they could stop the inter-party bickering and decide on a candidate.

The likelihood of winning the Democratic presidential nomination at the onset of the convention appeared bleak for Woodrow Wilson. Although the Governor of New Jersey had campaigned extensively throughout the country he gained support in just a few states. The person leading the list of presidential hopefuls was Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives, who had “swept through” the primaries. The candidates needed two-thirds of the possible 1088 delegates to secure the nomination; Clark had four hundred, Wilson held two hundred forty-eight, and a third contender, James Underwood of Alabama, had roughly one hundred delegates.²⁰

An event in the opening days of the convention helped define Woodrow Wilson and influenced his chances for success. William Jennings Bryan still carried a lot of weight in the Democratic Party, his support critical in securing the nomination. Bryan, a voice for the Progressive movement, took issue with the choice for the Democratic convention chairman, a conservative named Alton T. Parker. He asked some of the Party leaders to align with him and challenge the appointment of chairman, Woodrow Wilson being one of them. Wilson’s campaign manager advised against siding with the Democratic candidate from 1900 and 1908, fearing it would isolate the delegates from New York, who carried a voting block of over ninety delegates. But the Governor from New Jersey took a stand. His reply separated him from the more passive, noncommittal Champ Clark, who advocated for Party harmony. “The Baltimore convention is to

¹⁹ This editorial cartoon was reprinted in Flehinger, *The 1912 Election and the Power of Progressivism*, and is included at the back of this paper.

²⁰ Link, Arthur, “The Baltimore Convention of 1912,” 691-692.

be a convention of progressives,” Wilson stated, “of men who are progressive in principle and by conviction.”²¹

During four days of balloting Woodrow Wilson chipped away at the lead held by Clark, and on the forty-third roll-call he secured the Democratic nomination for President of the United States.²² His running mate and Vice-Presidential candidate would be the Governor of Indiana, Thomas Marshall. Not in attendance at the convention in Baltimore, Wilson received the news with his wife and children while “relaxing” at his beach house in Sea Girt, New Jersey. A forty piece marching band blasted their horns in celebration.²³

The Governor of New Jersey now had to sell his vision of Progressive reform to the American people. He aligned himself with a group known as the anti-corporatists, led by Louis Brandeis, an advisor to Wilson, and Robert La Follette, a senator from Wisconsin who had been part of the Republican Party progressive movement. The anti-corporatists believed that corruption was inherent to big business. They advocated for direct democracy – referendum and recall - and social reform that included child labor laws and better wages for workers.²⁴ With their version of progressive reform and Woodrow Wilson’s skillful ability to relate the program to the average working class American, the Democrats felt confident that their candidate could win the election. Add to the equation the battle between Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft and the Republican Party divide that occurred two weeks prior at their convention, and the presidency for the Democrats was all but guaranteed.

²¹ Link, 693-694.

²² Kelly, 172.

²³ Kelly, 174.

²⁴ Flehinger, 41-46.

From a very early age the future of William Howard Taft seemed apparent. His father, Alphonso Taft, served as Secretary of War under President Ulysses S. Grant and under Rutherford B. Hayes as Attorney General. Like his father, William graduated from Yale near the top of his class, and after practicing law for a few years, began his life as a public servant. He worked for the city of Cincinnati as the collector of internal revenue and later for the state of Ohio as a judge of the superior court. The young Republican's first federal position came when President Benjamin Harrison asked him to serve as Solicitor General, and although he desired a seat on the Supreme Court, the one-time judge from Ohio accepted the job and headed for Washington. Next, Taft accepted an appointment from President William McKinley to head the U.S. Commission to the Philippines in 1900, even though he opposed the acquisition of the islands and knew nothing of colonial administration.²⁵ But the aspiring Supreme Court Justice performed his job well, and in 1903 he became Secretary of War under a friend that would later become his nemesis.

By the time he entered the presidential campaign of 1912, Theodore Roosevelt had accomplished more than most people could in ten lifetimes. He “wrote books, fought Spaniards, snooped on policeman, won the Nobel Peace Prize, closed illegal bars,.... boxed as an amateur, hunted lions, won the governorship of New York and the presidency of the United States,... took the Canal Zone and built the Panama Canal, and ranched cattle.”²⁶ The historian and adventurer felt as comfortable dining with the upper-class as he did hobnobbing with hoodlums.

Roosevelt's career as a politician began in 1881 when he was elected into the New York State assembly. The young Republican quickly gained notoriety by suggesting an investigation

²⁵ Kelly, 13-14.

²⁶ Broderick, 9.

into the political corruption of New York City, and although nothing came of it, he had begun to define himself as a politician. He left the political arena for a few years, however, when in 1884 both his mom and his wife died within twelve hours of each other in the same house, the mother from an illness, the wife in child birth. The Colonel spent the following years trying his hand as a cattle rancher, but after losing his investment of \$75,000 due to a cold winter, Roosevelt returned to politics. He played a part in helping Benjamin Harrison defeat Grover Cleveland in the presidential election of 1888, and accepted the offer from Harrison as Civil Service commissioner, a position he held for six years. Roosevelt returned to New York City afterward and got a second chance to investigate corruption when Mayor William Strong gave him the title of president of the Board of Police Commissioners. It did not take long for Teddy to stir things up. He would go out at night with a couple of “reporter friends” to check on wayward police officers, and on Sundays make sure saloons were closed, as pursuant to the law. This was the greatness of Theodore Roosevelt. His tenacity and enthusiasm for his work had to have been contagious. It certainly got him noticed, not just in New York, but throughout the country.²⁷

The Colonel’s next endeavor contributed to his legend in a grand way. In the 1896 presidential election Roosevelt joined the effort to secure the White House for the Republican nominee, William McKinley, and the soon to be war hero received his reward and next appointment, assistant secretary of the navy. The timing could not have been better. After the sinking of the USS Maine in the harbor of Havana the United States declared war on Spain. Not content to sit behind a desk, Roosevelt crossed the Gulf of Mexico with his regiment of volunteers, the Rough Riders, and led the charge in San Juan Heights. With newspaper

²⁷ Broderick, 10-12.

journalists recording the events, the Colonel had participated in the effort that broke the Spanish defenses and facilitated their surrender.²⁸

Returning to the states a hero, Theodore Roosevelt accepted the nomination for Governor of New York, and with the Rough Riders campaigning at his side, easily won the governorship. In his new position the chief executive began his record of progressivism. He pushed for better working conditions in sweat shops, factory inspections, and for limited working hours for women and children. However, when the governor started to look closely into the dealings of banks and insurance companies, the political machine that made up the legislature took offense. One way to get rid of Roosevelt, they surmised, would be to suggest to the powers that controlled the Republican Party that the war veteran run alongside President McKinley as the vice-presidential nominee in 1900. The suggestion worked, the Republican ticket won the White House, and after the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901, the adventurer and hero became the 26th President of the United States.²⁹

At age forty-three Theodore Roosevelt had become one of the youngest presidents to take office. Although not entirely prepared for the role, his bold personality enabled the presidential apprentice to quickly advance his agenda. From the “bully pulpit” of the presidency Roosevelt began the push for progressive reform. When he first took office the corporate community did not know what direction the new president would take. McKinley had a laissez-faire approach to economic policy and a business friendly attitude. Roosevelt, however, considered unpredictable and a loose cannon, had begun to introduce the regulation of business as a vice president. So it had to have been no surprise that he continued this policy as president. The chief executive

²⁸ Broderick, 15-16.

²⁹ Broderick, 17.

began by giving the Sherman Antitrust Act a shot in the arm. Passed in 1890, the act was meant to outlaw monopolies, but remained ineffective. Roosevelt instructed the attorney general to take action against certain monopolies, and with the help of public opinion, the Supreme Court began to interpret the legislation in a way that held these monopolies accountable. He continued the push for reform through passage of the Hepburn Act, which gave greater authority to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The governmental agency, created in 1887 to control the rates set by the nation's railroads, had no real impact until passage of the act.³⁰

As his first term as president came to an end several events occurred that would cement Theodore Roosevelt's re-election. One would be his dealings with the coal strike of 1904. Roosevelt appointed a commission to successfully resolve the issue, saving the people of the country from a cold winter. Another would be the creation of the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1903, which reported on the conduct of corporations. In the same year Roosevelt helped Panama revolt against the government of Columbia, and in return Panama gave the United States sovereignty over the ten mile canal zone. These actions propelled the incumbent to a landslide victory over the Democratic nominee, Judge Alton B. Parker. As a second term president Roosevelt continued his policies of reform with the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act. He also initiated the White House Conservation Commission led by Gifford Pinchot who would later become Chief Forester of the United States. Although the popular president could have most likely won a third term, he made a statement that would come back to haunt him. "...The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form. Under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another

³⁰ Romero, Francine, *Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt through Coolidge, 1901-1929*, 1-2.

nomination.”³¹ The Colonel then handed the reigns of the White House over to the Secretary of War, William Howard Taft.

William Taft had not aspired to be president of the United States, and never became as comfortable in the role as his predecessor. Even though he liked and admired Roosevelt and agreed with most of the policies rendered, the newly elected chief executive disagreed with the way in which they had been achieved. Roosevelt had used the power of the presidency to its fullest, often bypassing Congress and consultation. Taft, having been a lawyer at heart, stayed true to the law and the Constitution in political matters. When it came to economic and social reform, along with the conservation of the nation’s natural resources, William Taft the attorney believed change should come through legislative process, whereas Theodore Roosevelt the Colonel thought change could occur by presidential decree. Taft’s philosophy slowed the process of progressive reform, which angered the young progressives within the Republican Party, and worked to begin the divide of the GOP.³²

Even before returning to America in 1910 from the jungles of Africa, Roosevelt was well aware that the Republican Party had fragmented. Gifford Pinchot had met the ex-president in Italy to inform him of Taft’s inadequacies.³³ Despite the encouragement from Pinchot and other leading progressives in the GOP, the Colonel declared he had no intention of entering the race for the Republican nomination for president. Instead, he returned to the political arena as a delegate at the New York State Republican Convention, and followed that with a nationwide speaking tour touting his program of “New Nationalism.” His program called for more regulation

³¹ Broderick, 22-23.

³² Romero, 61-63.

³³ Broderick, 37.

of corporations in the form of increased powers for the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Bureau of Corporations. Roosevelt wanted graduated income and inheritance taxes, more effective control of the currency, more active conservation policies, and direct primaries. At the same time he was a contributing editor to *Outlook* magazine and on monthly basis reported on the inactiveness of the incumbent president.³⁴ The friendship that Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft once shared began to crumble, and the possibility of the two facing off against each other at the Republican Convention in 1912 seemed more likely than ever.

As January of 1912 had come and gone the Colonel continued to deny his interest in the presidency, but confided to Governor Chase Osborn of Michigan that if the people demanded he enter the race, he would have no choice but to do so. A month later the decision would be made for him. Senator Robert La Follette from Wisconsin had announced his intention to run for the Republican candidate for president in 1911. One of the leaders of the progressive movement and a well known politician, the Senator had a legitimate chance to win the nomination. But he had little support outside his home state and feared some of his campaign workers had switched allegiance, jumping on board the Roosevelt train. And then, in February of 1912, La Follette sealed his fate. In a speech in Philadelphia he rambled on for over two hours losing his train of thought, verbally attacked the audience, and appeared to have had a mental breakdown. Two days later Roosevelt entered the race, announcing “My hat is in the ring.”³⁵

From the moment the Colonel announced his candidacy the gloves came off, no holds barred. Roosevelt accused Taft of being “antidemocratic, beholden to corrupt bosses, and a turncoat who had betrayed the Roosevelt legacy.” Taft responded by calling his former friend a

³⁴ Broderick, 38.

³⁵ Flehinger, 10-11.

“power-hungry, would-be dictator, who might never give up office if reelected.”³⁶ And as incredible it must have been to watch these two carry out their battle in public, the most important aspect that would determine the Republican nomination occurred away from public the arena. For the first time in history direct primary elections were held in a few states in which voters would decide the state’s choice for their presidential candidate, and Roosevelt dominated these primaries. Unfortunately for the Colonel, a majority of the states still selected their choice of candidate through caucuses, and Taft controlled this process, in part by handing jobs to his loyal supporters. In an ironic twist, the caucus system that impeded Roosevelt’s nomination is the same system he used to secure Taft’s nomination four years prior in the 1908 election.³⁷

The Republican Party Convention opened in June of 1912 in the city of Chicago with William Taft clearly in the lead, and the incumbent won the nomination on the first ballot, but not without controversy. Roosevelt challenged two hundred fifty-four of the five hundred delegates necessary to secure the nomination, accusing Taft of theft, fraud, and betrayal of the party. If the committee had given just seventy of these delegates to the Colonel, he would have won the nomination. But Taft had control of the convention and the GOP, and the Republican candidacy belonged to him. The cost, however, was high. The Republican Party had been divided, the old conservative front favoring the President, and the young progressives backing the Colonel. Claiming to be the victim of fraud, Roosevelt stormed out of the convention along with three-quarters of his delegates and declared “We stand at Armageddon and we battle for the

³⁶ Flehinger, 12.

³⁷ Ibid, 12.

Lord.” The former president took his army of progressives into a new battle ground under the heading of a new political party, the Progressive Party.³⁸

The new party’s convention, held in August of 1912 in the city of Chicago, seemed more like a church revival than a presidential nominating convention. As the savior of the party the Colonel easily won the Progressive candidacy, and titled his acceptance speech “A Confession of Faith.” Many of the progressive reformers had acquired their passion from the social gospel movement, which “saw Christianity as a social movement and politics as an expression of religious morality.” Revival songs and hymns could be heard throughout the convention. The new party aligned their religious message with revolutionary symbolism, going as far as to adopt socialist’s red bandana as their own symbol, much to the dislike of Eugene Debs and the Socialist Party. The Progressive Party Convention also became an outlet for the women’s suffrage movement, providing a forum for the female political leaders of the day like Jane Addams, founder of Chicago’s Hull House, a settlement house that provided child care, counseling, language classes, and other social services.³⁹ Now that the stage was set, the Bull Moose took the party platform and hit the campaign trail.

By October of 1912, just over a month before election day, the three leading candidates carried on as if they already knew the outcome. Wilson had gained a confidence throughout the campaign that grew with each new speech. He continued his tour of the states from the back of a Pullman car, delivering his message of social and economic reform in a way that every concerned low wage worker could understand. Taft had no illusions about a Republican victory, and decided that golf and a few speeches now and then were quite sufficient. Roosevelt circled

³⁸ Flehinger, 13-14.

³⁹ Flehinger, 14-15.

the country, keeping up the good fight, but he too understood the situation when stating “My judgment is that [Wilson] will win, and that I will do better than Taft.”⁴⁰ Although not the favorite to win the election, the Colonel still held on to center stage. Not only did the assassination attempt in Milwaukee on October 14th put him in the spotlight, it put pressure on the other candidates to respond with a show of sympathy. Both Wilson and Taft agreed to put their campaigns on hold until they knew that Roosevelt would be fine, although Taft made the comment a few days later that “His supporters , and I have no doubt he is willing to profit by it, are making as much of it as they can.”⁴¹ The Bull Moose, true to form, insisted the candidates not let up: “The welfare of any one man in this fight is wholly immaterial, compared to the great and fundamental issues involved.”⁴²

On election day, November 5, 1912, Eugene Debs was in Terre Haute, Indiana to oblige his neighbors, and because he never registered in the county, could not vote. Instead he celebrated his fifty-seventh birthday. President William Taft, after returning from New York to attend the funeral of the Vice-President and his running mate James Sherman, spent the day in his home town of Cincinnati, Ohio. He voted, and then played a round of golf. Theodore Roosevelt spent part of the day at Madison Square Garden in New York City, campaigning for the New York State candidates, and then made his way back to Oyster Bay to wait for the results. And Woodrow Wilson, having finished his campaign with optimism and a four inch gash in his head, had returned to New Jersey and walked the campus of Princeton. He received word from

⁴⁰ Broderick, 184.

⁴¹ Kelly, 261.

⁴² Ibid, 246-247.

his wife at exactly 10 PM that it had become official. The former president of Princeton and Governor of New Jersey would be the next President of the United States.⁴³

The 1912 election results were as follow: Wilson received 6,296,547 popular votes, 41.9 percent, and 435 electoral votes; Roosevelt received 4,118,571 popular votes, 27.4 percent, and 88 electoral votes; Taft received 3,486,720 popular votes, 23.2 percent, and 8 electoral votes; and Debs received 900, 672 popular votes, 6 percent, and no electoral votes.⁴⁴ The numbers reveal some important factors of this election. When you combine the totals of Wilson and Roosevelt they add up to nearly seventy percent of the popular vote. These two candidates proposed aggressive action in their programs of reform. Taft's views on progressivism were considered conservative and slow moving. The voters clearly wanted change, and they didn't want to wait for it. Another indicator in the public's need for reform is the vote count for the Socialist Party, whose candidate had received more votes than any other time in the party's history. The fact that Roosevelt routed Taft in the delegate count is somewhat startling. The Republican Party had never finished third in a presidential election, especially to a party that had been formed just three months before the election.

Most importantly, when you combine the totals of Taft and Roosevelt they bypass Wilson by nearly nine percent, indicating that the rift that occurred between the Colonel and the incumbent president, and the split in the Republican Party that resulted, played a decisive role in the outcome of this election. Of course one cannot downplay the significance of the Democrat's choice of Woodrow Wilson as their candidate. His program of economic and social reform, along with his demeanor and skillful ability to relate his plan to the average American, certainly

⁴³ Broderick, 201-202.

⁴⁴ Flehinger, 57.

contributed greatly to the outcome of this election. The leading factor, however, had to be the ego of Theodore Roosevelt. The Colonel could not stay out of a good fight, and he found one when returning from his adventures in Africa. His successor and friend had not followed the Roosevelt agenda for the country, and the battle that played out between the two not only divided the Republican Party, but guaranteed the next President of the United States would be a Democratic candidate, Woodrow Wilson.

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The Origins of the Great Schism

The ideal of a unified Christendom, a body of Christian believers under one Holy Catholic Church, was put forth by Church fathers in the Nicene Creed. But even while united under Constantine's conversion and the historic aegis of the Roman Empire, the new Christendom inherited a deep cultural division between its Western Latin and Eastern Greek peoples. A progressive estrangement, provoked by these cultural but also theological and political differences, ultimately caused the final rupture of the Church known as the Great Schism. But while these multiple paths toward schism—in the form of divergent cultural and theological traditions—would undoubtedly influence this progressive estrangement, they collided only as a result of the Crusades, which alone would seal the irreparable schism within Christendom.

In examining the cultural division of the Greeks and Latins, it is important to understand its greater socio-political context, taking into account that these peoples thrived for centuries as Romans. While cultural differences were not the decisive cause of schism, they nevertheless reinforced a progressive estrangement between the Latin and Greek peoples of Christendom. One of the more profound of such differences—and one which would shape the course of religious development in the eastern and western worlds—is the nature of the Latin and Greek languages. Greek is a language of introspection; a single word can comprise shades of meaning, reflecting a culture of speculative philosophy at once tedious and esoteric to those uncomfortable with its abstraction. Latin, on the other hand, is a language of law; words are rigid and inflexible, suitable for a people more comfortable with formula than speculation.

It is thus understandable that both Greeks and Latins would eventually develop two different ways of approaching Christianity, as exemplified by two early church leaders, Tertullian of the West, and his contemporary Clement of Alexandria of the East. Tertullian offered constructions of faith, such as the *regulae fidei* or rule of faith, and coined new words like “Trinity” which provided for the basic doctrines of Christianity. (Noll 135) Conversely, Clement was more meditative, rather than closing theological debate with formulas like Tertullian, Clement introduced new problems and in turn stimulated discussion as to the realities of Christianity. These divergent tendencies shaped the developing religious consciousness of both cultures.

As can be inferred from these divergent modes of theological inquiry, the East tended to be more open to debate; this openness stemmed not just from a cultural particularity but also from an ecumenism rooted in apostolic foundations. The four patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, Constantinople, and Jerusalem granted primacy to the Roman bishop as the heir of Saint Peter—he was honored as first among equals—but ultimately doctrine was to be established by Ecumenical Council. The Pope, however, not only assumed his seat as prime but as supreme. As successor of Saint Peter, who in the Bible is given the keys of heaven, his pronouncements were held as doctrinal truth. Steven Runciman, in *Eastern Schism*, notes that for the Western Church “the Pope was not only the supreme governor of the Church but also supreme arbiter on doctrine. An Oecumenical Council...was to endorse and promulgate papal pronouncements... infallibility was an implicit prerogative of the Pope.” (Runciman 10). This attitude toward papal power would make the Western church more centralized and autocratic than those of the east, an impulse that attained new dimensions with the barbarian invasions and subsequent collapse of the Western Empire.

With the coming of the barbarian hordes and the chaos it engendered, the Church in Rome would attain a new prominence in not only spiritual but political affairs as well. The collapse of Imperial authority in the West left the Church as the last vestige of the Roman Empire; it thus enlarged its influence as the sole stable authority. The Popes and bishops became administrators, negotiated with the barbarians, and dealt with secular affairs in a manner unknown to the East, where the Emperor still preserved his role as the source of law. As Ware notes, “By force of circumstances, the Pope assumed a part which the Greek Patriarchs were not called to play, issuing commands not only to his ecclesiastical subordinates but to secular rulers as well. The western Church gradually became centralized to a degree unknown anywhere in the four Patriarchates of the east.” (Ware 47)

Another important consequence of the barbarian invasions was the destruction of secular education in the West. As a result the laity lapsed into a profound ignorance, the only education that survived was provided by the Church for its clergy. This reinforced the already hierarchical structure of the Church, making the laymen entirely reliant on the clergy for theological interpretation. (Ware 48) In Byzantium such a discrepancy between laity and clergy never existed to this extent; common Christians were literate and comfortable with theological discussion. The collapse of education in the West also resulted in a decrease in communication with the East, as less people could speak Greek, while simultaneously the knowledge of Latin in the East also diminished. Thus relations with the East became more difficult; as Ware states, “Because the two sides could no longer communicate easily with one another, and each could no longer read what the other wrote, misunderstandings arose much more easily. The shared ‘universe of discourse’ was progressively lost.” (Ware 48) This was the most significant consequence of the barbarian invasions. A decline in

communications was not as violently immediate as the sack of Rome, but in their progressive separation both East and West would lose their common identity under Christendom.

Regardless of their differences, East and West practiced theologies that in large part complemented one another. It is only when historical circumstances estranged the two cultures that these differences shifted from mere temperamental disparities to distinctive religious cultures. To understand this change it is worth quoting Ware at length:

East and West were becoming strangers to one another...In the early Church there had been a unity of faith, but a diversity of theological schools. From the start Greeks and Latins had approached the Christian Mystery in their own way...it can be said that the Latin approach was more practical, the Greek more speculative... these two... were not in themselves contradictory; each served to supplement one another, and each had its place in the fullness of Catholic tradition. But now that the two sides were becoming strangers to one another—with no political and little cultural unity, with no common language—there was a danger that each side would follow its own approach in isolation and push it to extremes, forgetting the value in the other point of view. (Ware 49)

The Islamic expansion in the seventh century furthered this cultural alienation. As Muslim forces swept across North Africa and seized control of the Mediterranean, a new obstacle arose between the already isolated East and West. As Noll states in *Turning Points*, “Now...even elementary contact between East and West had to surmount an alien Imperial power as well as ingrained cultural tendencies.” (Noll 136) The Muslim expansion also heightened the importance of the see of Constantinople. The disintegration of Christian influence in Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria left the Patriarch in Constantinople as the undisputed leader of Eastern Christendom. This further polarized East and West, as Runciman states; “The rivalry between the Patriarchs became simply the rivalry between Rome and Constantinople.” (Runciman 19) This new relationship also had political implications; with diminishing Byzantine influence in the West, the Roman gaze would increasingly look northward to the Franks.

This slow shift away from the East was made decisive in 753, when Pope Stephen II was refused military assistance from Constantinople to defend Rome from the Lombard invasions. The Pope was forced to visit the Frankish ruler, Pepin, for assistance. This fateful maneuver ushered in a new period of Frankish influence over Rome which fundamentally altered the character of Western Christianity. For Mark Noll, this signals a “transition of Western Christianity from a Mediterranean, eastern-oriented faith to an expressly European, northward-looking form of religion.” (Noll 120) This new alliance between Rome and the Franks ultimately led to the coronation of Charlemagne as Holy Roman Emperor by Pope Leo III, an action refused recognition by Byzantium. Still adhering to a notion of imperial unity, Constantinople saw Charlemagne as a usurper who defied its authority over the Roman Empire. According to historian John Meyendorff, for Byzantine contemporaries “the legitimate Roman Empire with its capital at Constantinople had not ceased to exist, and its claim to rule the entire Christian Roman world had never been given up.” (41 Meyendorff) In reality this claim was illusory; the Eastern Emperor’s political sway in Western Europe had long since diminished by the time of Charlemagne’s coronation. But the creation of the Holy Roman Empire in the west crystallized this progressive political estrangement. The implications of this northward reorientation would not become fully realized until the ecclesiastical battles of the eleventh century.

The new Carolingian influence resulted in a marked change in Western theological thought. Runciman states, “In Rome the Germans eventually established their authority; and their victory meant first that ideas originating north of the Alps for reforming the Church began to be tried out at Rome, and secondly that German Theology triumphed there.” (Runciman 28) One such idea, which is still a point of bitter contention between Catholic and

Orthodox to this day, is the insertion of the *Filioque* into the Nicene Creed. The dispute involves the procession of the Holy Spirit. While the Eastern Churches uphold the original formulation, which finds the Holy Spirit as proceeding “from the Father by the Son”, the new Western interpolation declares it as “from the Father and the Son.” (Meyendorff 42) But the quarrel went beyond issues of theology; it struck at the very foundation of Eastern notions of Church government, which held that only by Ecumenical Council could alterations of doctrine occur. Rome saw it as its divine prerogative to establish such an alteration, and thus the *Filioque* exposed a deeper tension existing between East and West: that involving the question of Church authority.

The question of Papal primacy had always existed beneath the surface of East-West relations, a latent tension which threatened to explode but was invariably veiled by the diplomacy and tact of leaders from both sides. But in the eleventh century, as a new reform movement gained power in Rome, the Papacy’s already autocratic disposition would appear ever more domineering to the East. The Abbey of Cluny—a religious order which pushed for a revival of Papal power—reached the height of its influence during the eleventh century. (Meyendorff 45). Advocates for a universalism of Papal authority, the Cluniacs helped the Papacy assert its power after a long period of decadence and political subservience to German authority. (Papadakis 28) It is thus unfortunate for relations within Christendom that this movement to restore Papal power coincided with a renewed contact between the peoples of East and West. With the Norman invasions in Byzantine Italy, this Papal policy would have unfortunate consequences for relations between common Greeks and Latins.

Although the year 1054 has traditionally been assigned as the date of final schism, it does not mark the final division between the Eastern and Western churches. But the schism

of 1054 is notable in that it shows how entangled political-ecclesiastical interests could bring already strained relations between East and West to a breaking point. Norman occupiers of Byzantine Italy began forcing Greek Christians to adopt Latin religious usages, such as the *Filoque*; an action Pope Leo IX, as their Latin patron, tolerated. (Ware 58) That the Pope accepted a forced conformity of religious practice reveals the transformation the Papacy had undergone as a result of the eleventh century reforms. To assert ecclesiological dominion over the Greeks was now regarded as justified Papal prerogative; “Hitherto the great Churches of Christendom had not been greatly troubled over divergences of usage...(but) the reformed papacy was anxious, in the interest of discipline and order, to introduce uniformity of usage.” (Runciman 5). In reaction, Michael Cerularius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, ordered Latin churches in Constantinople to conform to Greek practices; when they refused he closed all of them in 1052. (Ware 58). In 1053 Cerularius contacted Pope Leo to settle the situation; in return Leo sent three legates to Constantinople for discussion. The discussions ended in mutual anathemas: when Cardinal Humbert lost patience with the dealings he issued a Bull of Excommunication against Cerularius, who in turn banned Cardinal Humbert as well. But the supposed schism of 1054 resulted in little more than the embitterment of both sides, and continued contact remained between the Churches of East and West. (Runciman 7)

After 1054 Christendom was still united. The 1054 dispute was largely a conflict of personalities—both Humbert and Cerularius were notorious for their uncompromising tempers—and no final schism had taken place between the Churches. Until this point hostility had existed only between church leaders, conflicts were matters of theology—issues that left the broader population unaffected. The common Christian still regarded his eastern or western counterpart in fellowship. As long as disputes remained in the higher echelons of

Church hierarchy, Christian populations were unaware of their progressive estrangement. It is only with the coming of the Crusader armies that a conscious separation divided the Christian world into a true and final schism.

The ill feelings of 1054 had largely dissipated by the time Turkish forces began to threaten the borders of the Byzantine Empire. Because both Norman and Muslim forces endangered Byzantium, the Eastern Emperor could not afford any further antagonism with the Papacy—it alone could reign in Norman incursions into Greek territory, and from it alone could the Emperor hope for aid against the Muslims. By now Papal reforms had helped elevate the Pope to a near omnipotence of authority in the West, his power over both secular and spiritual matters was unquestioned. This authority is amply demonstrated by the reaction to Pope Urban II's call to arms in 1095. Responding to an appeal by the Eastern Emperor Alexius Comnenus for aid in combating the Turks, Urban summoned the forces of Christendom to beat back the aggression. His act "sought to prove that he could command the allegiance of men of war in every part of Western Europe...The hordes of pilgrims who set forth at his command proved this up to a hilt. Henceforth no Byzantine could doubt that the Pope was the real emperor of the West." (Every 159) To be sure, Urban genuinely wished to help the Christians of the east. But also in coming to its rescue he hoped to finally end Eastern intransigence against Papal supremacy; his Holy War would unite East and West under the rightful hegemony of the Pope. He could not know that his Crusade would lead to the very opposite of this intention.

From the onset of the First Crusade the visions of its mission were divergent. In the West, much of the crusade's appeal was its emotional religiosity. Far from advancing any rationale grounded in political reality, Urban's summon proclaimed a new Christian ideal;

that of the Crusader—a militant pilgrim with a divinely ordained mission to free the Holy Land and establish Christian rule. Conversely, the East was less romantic; its task was to protect its borders from advancing Turks. Every explains; “The emperor wanted soldiers to recover his lost provinces, but the most religious of the Crusaders were the most anxious to press on at once to Jerusalem. They thought of the Crusade as a great armed pilgrimage, to restore the Holy Places to the possession of Latin Christians.” (Every 160) As the crusader armies marched into the Holy Land, capturing Antioch in 1098 and then Jerusalem in 1099, the implications of these differing goals would become fully manifested in the local schisms it produced.

The Latin occupation of Antioch signaled a new period of hostility within Christendom. Rome’s universalist claims were no longer confined to theological dispute; they emerged from theoretical abstraction to materialize in the form of Latin rule in the Holy Land. In Antioch the rule of the Frankish Count Bohemund of Taranto made the Greek Patriarch’s position untenable. The Patriarchy had become an instrument for Papal domination in the east; “If the Latins could keep their hold on Antioch...Constantinople might gradually be assimilated...not in liturgy and ritual, but in the manner of subordination to the Pope.” (166 Every) The Patriarch John was soon driven into exile and replaced by a Latin Patriarch, whose authority the local Greek population refused to recognize. (Ware 59) Now an open rivalry existed between the Latin and Greek peoples of Antioch. As Runciman states, “A schism started in Antioch in 1100, with two rival lines of Patriarchs, each claiming to be in the apostolic succession.” (Runciman 22)

In 1187, when Saladin conquered Jerusalem, the schism became not just an ideological cleavage of loyalties, but also physically divided the Christian communities of Palestine.

Preceding Saladin's conquest the Latin Patriarch had ruled without demur—the exiled Greek line was obscure and unrecognized—but with the coming of Islam Latin Christians could no longer claim religious monopoly. Granting a request from Constantinople, Saladin allowed a new Greek Patriarch to rule alongside his Latin rival. (Runciman 88) Now, as in Antioch, the Christian population was divided. The schism was no longer a matter restricted to Church hierarchy. Common Christians were implicated in the pretensions of Rome, and thus hostility that had hitherto existed solely between Constantinople and Rome now existed between Greek and Latin populations. Once again, Ware is instructive:

These local schisms at Antioch and Jerusalem were a sinister development. Rome was very far away, and if Rome and Constantinople quarreled, what practical difference did it make to the average Christian in Syria or Palestine? But when two rival bishops claimed the same throne and two hostile congregations existed in the same city, the division became an immediate reality in which simple believers were directly implicated. It was the Crusades that turned the dispute into something that involved whole Christian congregations, and not just church leaders; the Crusaders brought the schism down to the local level. (Ware 60)

It was the tragic disaster of the Fourth Crusade which crystallized the steady disintegration of Latin and Greek relations; it is the final event which sealed the Great Schism. To be sure, Latin and Greek animosity had already attained a feverish magnitude by the time Latin invaders sacked Constantinople. After centuries of isolated development, these two cultures came together for the defense of Christendom. But it was an uncomfortable reunion: to the Latins Byzantium seemed alien and unwelcoming, in turn the Greeks regarded the Western armies—brimming with the pious zeal of Holy War—as barbaric and alarmingly ravenous for blood to spill. But there was as yet no formal schism; both sides still expected an eventual renewal of goodwill and unity (Armstrong 389). The destruction of Constantinople would destroy any chances at a rapprochement between East and West.

In 1204 a Crusader army initially bound for Egypt changed course for Constantinople to restore the Emperor Isaac Angelus to the throne. Negotiations began when the Crusaders unexpectedly found the Byzantines hostile to this political intervention. But finally the Crusaders grew weary of what they saw as Greek deception and sacked the city. For three days a relentless onslaught desecrated Constantinople; the city was permanently crippled, it would never again regain its former luster. Runciman offers us a harrowing description of the carnage:

For nine centuries the great city had been the capital of Christian civilization. It was filled with works of art that had survived from ancient Greece...But the (crusaders) rushed in a howling mob down the streets and through the houses, snatching up everything...destroying whatever they could not carry, pausing only to murder or to rape...Palaces and hovels alike were entered and wrecked. Wounded women and children lay dying in the streets. For three days the ghastly scenes of pillage and bloodshed continued, till the huge and beautiful city was a shambles. (Runciman 144)

The pope of the time, Innocent III, condemned the destruction, but nevertheless was pleased at the prospect of Eastern submission to his rule. He allowed for a Latin Kingdom to be established, but unsurprisingly it failed and was shortly overthrown by the Byzantines. The sack of Constantinople permanently divided East and West. With their swords the Crusaders severed Christendom; to Eastern Christians the crime was irremediable, for all Christians the Great Schism was complete.

With the effects of diminished communications due to the barbarian invasions, the expansion of Islam, and the orientation of the Western church towards Northern Europe, two religious tendencies—once united under the politico-religious sphere of Christendom—were allowed to steadily drift apart toward dichotomy. With the crusades these cultures found each other again, but as strangers—as alien cultures with a shared past now long buried by the circumstances of centuries. For this reason the Crusades were a crucial turning point in the relations between Greeks and Latins. It brought the schism to the popular level, now instead

of disputes of administration or doctrine entire cultures saw in one another a bitter enemy. As

Runciman states:

If the schism had arisen merely out of quarrels over precedence and customs or even over administrative and doctrinal authority, the sincere attempts made by subsequent Emperors to heal it might have succeeded. But the tragedy of the schism was that it was not a matter of superficial jealousies and conflicting ecclesiastical traditions. It went deeper; it was based on mutual dislike between the peoples of Eastern and Western Christendom” (54 Runciman)

Perhaps it is inevitable that East and West would drift apart. But prior to the Crusades, cultural, ecclesiological, and theological differences had not produced a final rupture. The Crusades were the ultimate cause of the Great Schism. Later attempts at reunion between the religious and political elite failed; the embittered Christian populace invariably rejected their compromises. No longer could the rift heal through negotiation and empty proclamations; the Great Schism now lay deeply entrenched in the heart of every Christian.

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